ANALYSIS: Iraq crackdown strengthens radical cleric and Iran

Just proposing a theory; to considerApr 2nd, 2008 - 18:39:57

Let's just put a few recent events together, and see where it goes - an opportunity for a rational discussion. I'm genuinely concerned that the Mideast problems will extend beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, and with the price of oil dependent on what happens, it can affect our 'soft' economy:

a). Cheney has been after Iran for years; just as he was after Iraq. Use the 'Axis' speech as an indicator. Incidentally, the latest news re the two Koreas does not read well at all, speaking of the 'Axis'.

b). Admiral Fallon retires, removing someone in power in opposition to action against Iran; and an impediment to Petraeus' policy.

c). While the fact remains that our troops are all tied up with both Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush has never been too keen on the logistics, and I doubt that would dissuade him from tackling Iran; or whether he now understands that starting a war has consequences years later. After December, it's not his job to worry about all of that - not that he's ever worried about such things before.

d). Al-Maliki, rather than directing his militias' efforts (aka 'the Iraqi Army) towards the many discrete criminal gangs in Basra, decides he needs to move against al Sadr before the provincial elections to remove competition. Since both al-Maliki and al-Sadr are backed by Iran, the risks are seen as minimal. This ends up essentially in a violent standoff even in Baghdad, and al-Maliki has to send representatives to the QODS leadership in Iran to get Iran to make an approach to al-Sadr (who was in Iran at the time) to unwind the mess. Instead of the Iraqi Army being seen as a force of now about 400,000, it becomes a ragtag group of militias with divided loyalty, swayed more by Shia loyalty than to Iraq itself.

Now, Iran's own conclusions:

a). They can control all of the Shia parties in Iraq, despite the presence of U.S. troops. Since the Shia are the Iraqi majority, Iran can either escalate or de-escalate tensions indirectly, with 162,000 American troops acting as peacekeepers. The Sunni cannot be counted on to stick with the program, since the U.S. is talking about not paying the CLC's down the road for not doing anything, since al Qaeda has moved north. The Kurds would rather have their own country, as the Peshmerga are capable, and they have oil deals going.

b). al-Maliki has really not accomplished anything he set out to in Mosul. He has to deal with integrating the Sunnni militias into the Iraqi Army, and that's moving slowly. That's the alternative to the U.S.' paying the CLC's themselves.

Another interesting link on Mosul and the Kurds:

www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JD03Ak01.html

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Here's an article right out of the Iranian press which shows what they're pitching to the Iranian public. I won't even bother to excerpt, since there's so much in there; but it's a remarkable world view, and should be examined.

www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=49868§ionid=351020104

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My theory is that Iran stirred up the latest problems in Iraq to keep the U.S. occupied, rather than our potentially getting involved with any actions against Iran. Iran is selling oil to China and India and others, and the Russians don't want to see U.S. military action against Iran, either. Bush is rounding up new NATO membership from amongst former Soviet satellites, irritating the situation with Russia that much more. Those new prospects to NATO supposedly would provide troops for Afghanistan as a thank-you to Bush for his efforts.

Not a good outlook at all. The U.S. public's becoming inured to all the problems, and their apathy in just being worn out hearing about it for 5 years may be the real problem. Like anaesthesia at the dentist; they're unaware of what's really going in.

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The other Iraqi civil warApr 2nd, 2008 - 18:45:34

www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JD03Ak01.html

The battle of Basra may be virtually over. But nobody's talking about the invisible Battle of Mosul.

President George W Bush's self-described 'defining moment' in Iraq amounted to this: General Qassem Suleimani, the head of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) , brokered a deal in Qom, Iran, between Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's envoys and Hadi al-Amri, the head of the Badr Organization and number two to Adbul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and a key player of the government in Baghdad. That sealed the end of the battle of Basra.

The IRGC was designated last year by Washington as a terrorist organization. Thus Iranian 'terrorists' brokered a peace deal between the two largest Shi'ite parties in Iraq - ending a Baghdad government offensive that was fully authorized and supported by air power by Washington, according to Bush's National Security Adviser Steven Hadley.

Meanwhile, in northern Iraq, the Kurds are meticulously involved in de facto annexing strategically crucial, oil-rich Tameem province, whose capital is Kirkuk, with reserves of up to 15 billion barrels. Sunni Arabs and Shi'ite Turkmen fear the prospect - and are dead-set against the postponed Kirkuk referendum, which should have been held on December 2007. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government in Baghdad knew for sure they would lose this vote and thus see Kirkuk become a part of autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan. So giving the excuse of 'administrative problems', they simply postponed the referendum.

It's true that Saddam Hussein 'Arabized' Kirkuk by getting rid of Kurds and bringing in Sunni Arabs. In theory, the name of the game now is restoring Kirkuk's population balance to the same level prior to Saddam's forced Arabization. The Kurds are angered with the referendum being postponed and any spark at this stage could turn into another full-blown civil war.

It's a total impasse. Sunni Arabs in Iraq would never forgive any government in Baghdad for delivering Kirkuk to the Kurds. And the Kurds will fight to the death for Kirkuk. Sunni Arabs keep denouncing accelerated, regional 'Kurdification' – translated as Kurdish monopoly of the provincial council and jobs in the police and civil service. This has led to the formation of Sunni Arab 'Awakening Councils' - just as in the Sunni belt - also financed and armed by the Americans.

Kurdish journalist Rebwar Fatah insists Kurds will never give up Kirkuk - unless in the very unlikely event that the city's population rejects annexation in the endlessly postponed Kirkuk referendum. And no matter how the explosive situation is spun, Kirkuk's population will always want to directly benefit from the surrounding oil wealth.

(more detail in the linked story)

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lol....Apr 2nd, 2008 - 22:17:19

Whittling Away at Sadr
By Austin Bay

After his outlaw militiamen raised white flags and skedaddled from their latest round of combat with the Iraqi Army, radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr declared victory.

He always does. He understands media bravado. He wagers that survival bandaged by bombast and swathed in sensational headlines is a short-term triumph. Survive long enough, and Sadr bets he will prevail.

This time, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issued a contrarian press release, however, calling the Iraqi Army's anti-militia operations in southern Iraq a 'success.'

A dispute over casualties in the firefights has ensued, as it always does. An Iraqi Interior Ministry spokesman alleged that Sadr's militia had been hit hard in six days of fighting, suffering 215 dead, 155 arrested and approximately 600 wounded. The government spokesman gave no casualty figures for Iraqi security forces.

No one, of course, could offer an independent confirmation, but if the numbers are accurate they provide an indirect confirmation of reports that Sadr's Mahdi Militia (Jaish al-Mahdi, hence the acronym JAM) had at least a couple thousand fighters scattered throughout southern Iraq. This is not shocking news, but a reason to launch a limited offensive when opportunity appeared.

Numbers, however, are a very limited gauge. The firefights, white flags, media debate and, for that matter, the Iraqi-led anti-militia offensive itself are the visible manifestations of a slow, opaque and occasionally violent political and psychological struggle that in the long term is likely democratic Iraq's most decisive: the control, reduction and eventual elimination of Shia gangs and terrorists strongly influenced if not directly supported by Iran.

Other Shia militia and gangs confront Iraq, but Sadr is the most vexing case. His father, a leading Shia cleric, was murdered -- many Iraqis believe at the order of Saddam Hussein. That makes his father a political and religious symbol.

And Sadr knows it. So do his financiers.

For four years, the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi government have intermittently sparred with Sadr, sometimes in parliament, sometimes in the streets.

The Iraqi government's strategy has been to bring former insurgents into the political process. Since interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi articulated that goal in mid-2004, the central government's complex array of enemies has sought to thwart that program.

Saddam's old cohorts managed to convince themselves that if they spread enough money around, killed enough people and hammered the U.S. electorate with bloody headlines the United States would leave and the Iraqi government would eventually collapse -- and they would return to power. Saddam's capture, trial and execution has all but snuffed out the old-line Baathists. Recall Maliki stoutly defended his decision to carry out the court's sentence of capital punishment. He bet with Saddam dead the tyrant's cult of personality would wither. It has.

Al-Qaida pursued the same strategy of blood for headlines. Al-Qaida in Iraq tried to ignite a sectarian war -- its now-dead emir, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, made that goal explicit in February 2004. Al-Qaida massacred en masse, to the point that U.S. Sen. Harry Reid (D for Defeatist) declared the war in Iraq lost. Then, the Sunni tribes in Anbar turned on al-Qaida. Sunni political integration is by no means complete, but al-Qaida has failed.

Now the Shia-led Iraqi government focuses on its chief Shia nemesis. How the Iraqi government handles Sadr matters. In August 2004, Sadr's thugs grabbed the Grand Mosque in Najaf. Sadr was counting on Americans to bomb the mosque. The United States opted to follow the political lead of Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Sistani's aides told coalition officers: 'Let us deal with Sadr. We know how to handle him and will do so. However, the coalition must not make him a martyr.'

The Iraqi way often appears to be indecisive, until you learn to look at its counter-insurgency methods in the frame of achieving political success, instead of the frame of American presidential elections.

In southern Iraq and east Baghdad, Sadr once again lost street face. Despite the predictable media umbrage, this translates into political deterioration.

Think of the Iraqi anti-Sadr method as a form of suffocation, a political war waged with the blessing of Ayatollah Sistani that requires daily economic and political action, persistent police efforts and occasional military thrusts.

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Iraq Army Flexes Muscles in BasraApr 3rd, 2008 - 00:33:52

Iraq Army Flexes Muscles in Basra

By ROBERT H. REID – 3 hours ago

BAGHDAD (AP) — Iraqi soldiers rolled through a Shiite militia stronghold in Basra on Wednesday, drawing scattered bombs and bullets that wounded a camera operator for a U.S.-funded TV station and narrowly missed the commander of government troops in the city.

Followers of anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr accused the army of violating an Iranian-brokered agreement that ended last week's fighting, which erupted in Basra and quickly engulfed Baghdad and major cities of the Shiite south.

Those complaints raised concern that fighting could flare again as the Iraqi government and Shiite militias maneuver for control of Basra — the country's oil capital 340 miles southeast of Baghdad and a major commercial center of 2 million people.

Iraqi troops met no significant resistance as a dozen-vehicle convoy drove Wednesday into the Hayaniyah district of central Basra, scene of fierce clashes last week with al-Sadr's Mahdi Army fighters.

Troops set up checkpoints and searched a few houses before leaving the neighborhood after a couple of hours, witnesses said.

An Iraqi cameraman working for the U.S.-funded Alhurra satellite television station was shot in the leg as he filmed the operation in Hayaniyah.

Later, the camera operator, Mazin al-Tayar, told Alhurra by telephone that the soldiers faced 'many roadside bombs and mortar rounds' during the operation, although there were no reports of military casualties.

One of the bombs exploded near a vehicle carrying the local Iraqi army commander, Lt. Gen. Mohan al-Fireji, but caused no injuries, according to Defense Ministry spokesman Mohammed al-Askari, who was traveling with the general.

The Basra joint operations center announced that Iraqi soldiers had detained two suspected militia figures in the Qibla area. A gunbattle erupted during the raid and an Iraqi army vehicle was set on fire.

Nevertheless, Basra's provincial governor, Mohammed al-Waili, said the overall situation in the oil-rich city was 'very calm and stable' and that normalcy was returning.

'We issued orders to all government employees to go to their offices starting from today and they will be obliged to work their full schedule,' he said.

But Basra residents contacted by telephone said many people were fearful that the truce might not last.

Underscoring those fears, clashes broke out hours later after Iraqi troops raided Basra's Maakal area, another Mahdi Army stronghold, according to local police who could not immediately provide further details.

A Mahdi Army spokesman in Basra, known as Abu Liqa al-Basri, said Wednesday that the militiamen were keeping a low profile on al-Sadr's orders. He accused Iraqi security forces of creating a 'crisis of trust' by mounting 'provocative raids' and arresting al-Sadr supporters.

'If the Iraqi army continues in its provocative raids, the consequences will be bad,' he said.

Despite an end to heavy fighting, the Interior Ministry spokesman, Maj. Gen. Abdul-Karim Khalaf, said security operations were continuing and that an April 8 deadline for gunmen to surrender their weapons remained in effect.

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