Middle East News
Sep 26, 2007, 18:54 GMT
US Senate calls for Iraq's partition
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Older Talkback
A lot of the countries in Africa, Asia, Americas and Australia through the colonial period. So one should not be weary of spilitting a country or putting together a country. I have for so long thought of dividing Iraq into three parts shiite, sunni and Kurd. I also support dividing Sudan as their are problems there between Arab and Black African tribes such as the Dinka, Sri Lanka between Thamils and Sinhalese, India with Kashmir, Nagaland and Manipuris agitating, China with it Tibet problem, Canada with Quebec and Native Americans also could incldue U.S.A. with native americans, UK split into England, Scotland, Wales,N.Ireland, Russia with its Chechnya problems and other republics and many other countries.
So lets not be weary about splitting a country the main thing is for the people to be able to receive equal allocation of resources and be able to keep their identity alive and be able to sustain their lives and livelihood and be able to pursue happiness. Thank you.
By that, I mean all of the OTHER countries that the other poster identified. Iraq really has no choice but partitioning, and it will be a complex undertaking. So many people are already displaced, there's no putting it back together as it was, and the Sunni have lost their property already.
that the U.S. has no right to decide how Iraq should or should not be split up just as they have no right to be in Iraq in the first place. By all acounts the country is much worse off now than under Sadam!
When Gates draws troops down, the true civil war will ensue. The U.S. had meddled throughout this fiasco, and the sure sign that partition is the solution was al-Maliki's stand against it.
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/09/28/iraq/main3306852.shtml
al-Maliki has consistently failed to make the tough choices, and someone has to do it. The refugees in Syria and Jordan are running out of funds, and are not permitted to work. They will have to return to Iraq - they are the technocrats and middle class who can rebuild Iraq. They will need safe haven, and the Sunni now in Iraq live inside walled enclaves for the most part, for their own protection. Where would the out-of-country refugees be safe if they returned? The only way to insure a safe Sunni area, outside of a miraculous formation of an Iraqi government who could run the place, is a single fully partitioned Sunni area, with Sunni police (militia) protecting it against the Shia.
This country was pasted together years ago, and the structure is gone. The identity of present-day Iraq can be traced back to the British Military occupation of the World War 1 and the civil administration established at the beginning of the British Mandate, which lasted from 1921 until independence in 1932.
www.mepc.org/journal_vol10/0312_hashim.asp
'As the dominant power in post-Saddam Iraq, the United States has to address, among other key issues, this relationship between state formation, security and military power as it begins the process of reconstructing that hapless country. For the United States to succeed, it needs also to avoid the mistakes made by the British, who created Iraq in 1921, and by successive independent rulers.'
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq
'Britain granted independence to Iraq in 1932, on the urging of King Faisal, though the British retained military bases and transit rights for their forces. King Ghazi of Iraq ruled as a figurehead after King Faisal's death in 1933, while undermined by attempted military coups, until his death in 1939. The United Kingdom invaded Iraq in 1941, for fear that the government of Rashid Ali might cut oil supplies to Western nations, and because of his strong ideological leanings to Nazi Germany. A military occupation followed the restoration of the Hashemite monarchy, and the occupation ended on October 26, 1947. The rulers during the occupation and the remainder of the Hashemite monarchy were Nuri al-Said, the autocratic prime minister, who also ruled from 1930–1932, and 'Abd al-Ilah, an advisor to the king Faisal II.'
Will the U.S. never learn to stop meddling in other countries. Let them settle their own problems - the U.S. did nothing in Iraq but to make a supreme mess and now can't figure out what to do. They don't understand the Middle East and WILL NOT be able to change their ideas, religion, etc., no matter how hard they try - nor should they! It would appear the U.S. has enough of their own problems to deal with - they just proceed to extend themselves far beyond capabilities!
'When Gates draws troops down, the true civil war will ensue. '
You have been wrong on everything you have posted here so far. It is a hoot. Even if it were the case there is already talk of surge 2. (Son of surge)
'The U.S. had meddled throughout this fiasco,'
LOL! We are occupying the country!
'and the sure sign that partition is the solution was al-Maliki's stand against it.'
Makes Zero sense.
Anbar's citizens needed protection before they would give their 'hearts and minds.'
BY FREDERICK W. KAGAN
Friday, September 28, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
Many politicians and pundits in Washington have ignored perhaps the most important point made by Gen. David Petraeus in his recent congressional testimony: The defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq requires a combination of conventional forces, special forces and local forces. This realization has profound implications not only for American strategy in Iraq, but also for the future of the war on terror.
As Gen. Petraeus made clear, the adoption of a true counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq in January 2007 has led to unprecedented progress in the struggle against al Qaeda in Iraq, by protecting Sunni Arabs who reject the terrorists among them from the vicious retribution of those terrorists. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly Wednesday, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also touted the effectiveness of this strategy while at the same time warning of al Qaeda in Iraq's continued threat to his government and indeed the entire region.
Yet despite the undeniable successes the new strategy has achieved against al Qaeda in Iraq, many in Congress are still pushing to change the mission of U.S. forces back to a counterterrorism role relying on special forces and precision munitions to conduct targeted attacks on terrorist leaders. This change would bring us back to the traditional, consensus strategy for dealing with cellular terrorist groups like al Qaeda--a strategy that has consistently failed in Iraq.
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the consensus of American strategists has been that the best way to fight a cellular terrorist organization like al Qaeda is through a combination of targeted strikes against key leaders and efforts to discredit al Qaeda's takfiri ideology in the Muslim community. Precision-guided munitions and special forces have been touted as the ideal weapons against this sort of group, because they require a minimal presence on the ground and therefore do not create the image of American invasion or occupation of a Muslim country.
A correlative assumption has often been that the visible presence of Western troops in Muslim lands creates more terrorists than it eliminates. The American attack on the Taliban in 2001 is often held up now--as it was at the time--as an exemplar of the right way to do things in this war: Small numbers of special forces worked with indigenous Afghan resistance fighters to defeat the Taliban and drive out al Qaeda without the infusion of large numbers of American ground forces. For many, Afghanistan is the virtuous war (contrasting with Iraq) not only because it was fought against the group that planned the 9/11 attacks, but also because it was fought in accord with accepted theories of fighting cellular terrorist organizations.
This strategy failed in Iraq for four years--skilled U.S. special-forces teams killed a succession of al Qaeda in Iraq leaders, but the organization was able to replace them faster than we could kill them. A counterterrorism strategy that did not secure the population from terrorist attacks led to consistent increases in terrorist violence and exposed Sunni leaders disenchanted with the terrorists to brutal death whenever they tried to resist. It emerged that 'winning the hearts and minds' of the local population is not enough when the terrorists are able to torture and kill anyone who tries to stand up against them.
Despite an extremely aggressive counterterrorism campaign, by the end of 2006, al Qaeda in Iraq had heavily fortified strongholds equipped with media centers, torture chambers, weapons depots and training areas throughout Anbar province; in Baghdad; in Baqubah and other parts of Diyala province; in Arab Jabour and other villages south of Baghdad; and in various parts of Salah-ad-Din province north of the capital. Al Qaeda in Iraq was blending with the Sunni Arab insurgency in a relationship of mutual support. It was able to conduct scores of devastating, spectacular attacks against Shiite and other targets. Killing al Qaeda leaders in targeted raids had failed utterly either to prevent al Qaeda in Iraq from establishing safe havens throughout Iraq or to control the terrorist violence.
The Sunni Arabs in Iraq lost their enthusiasm for al Qaeda very quickly after their initial embrace of the movement. By 2005, currents of resistance had begun to flow in Anbar, expanding in 2006. Al Qaeda responded to this rising resistance with unspeakable brutality--beheading young children, executing Sunni leaders and preventing their bodies from being buried within the time required by Muslim law, torturing resisters by gouging out their eyes, electrocuting them, crushing their heads in vices, and so on. This brutality naturally inflamed the desire to resist in the Sunni Arab community--but actual resistance in 2006 remained fitful and ineffective. There was no power in Anbar or anywhere that could protect the resisters against al Qaeda retribution, and so al Qaeda continued to maintain its position by force among a population that had initially welcomed it willingly.
The proof? In all of 2006, there were only 1,000 volunteers to join the Iraqi Security Forces in Anbar, despite rising resentment against al Qaeda. Voluntarism was kept down by al Qaeda attacks against ISF recruiting stations and targeted attacks on the families of volunteers. Although tribal leaders had begun to turn against the terrorists, American forces remained under siege in the provincial capital of Ramadi--they ultimately had to level all of the buildings around their headquarters to secure it from constant attack. An initial clearing operation conducted by Col. Sean MacFarland established forward positions in Ramadi with tremendous difficulty and at great cost, but the city was not cleared; attacks on American forces remained extremely high; and the terrorist safe-havens in the province were largely intact.
This year has been a different story in Anbar, and elsewhere in Iraq. The influx of American forces in support of a counterinsurgency strategy--more than 4,000 went into Anbar--allowed U.S. commanders to take hold of the local resentment against al Qaeda by promising to protect those who resisted the terrorists. When American forces entered al Qaeda strongholds like Arab Jabour, the first question the locals asked is: Are you going to stay this time? They wanted to know if the U.S. would commit to protecting them against al Qaeda retribution. U.S. soldiers have done so, in Anbar, Baghdad, Baqubah, Arab Jabour and elsewhere. They have established joint security stations with Iraqi soldiers and police throughout urban areas and in villages. They have worked with former insurgents and local people to form 'concerned citizens' groups to protect their own neighborhoods. Their presence among the people has generated confidence that al Qaeda will be defeated, resulting in increased information about the movements of al Qaeda operatives and local support for capturing or killing them.
The result was a dramatic turnabout in Anbar itself--in contrast to the 1,000 recruits of last year, there have already been more than 12,000 this year. Insurgent groups like the 1920s Revolution Brigades that had been fighting alongside al Qaeda in 2006 have fractured, with many coming over to fight with the coalition against the terrorists--more than 30,000 Iraq-wide, by some estimates. The tribal movement in Anbar both solidified and spread--there are now counter-al Qaeda movements throughout Central Iraq, including Diyala, Baghdad, Salah-ad-Din, Babil and Ninewah. Only recently an 'awakening council' was formed in Mosul, Ninewah's capital, modeled on the Anbar pattern.
A targeted raid killed Abu Musaab al Zarqawi, founder of al Qaeda in Iraq, near Baqubah in June 2006. After that raid, al Qaeda's grip on Baqubah and throughout Diyala only grew stronger. But skillful clearing operations conducted by American forces, augmented by the surge, have driven al Qaeda out of Baqubah almost entirely. The 'Baqubah Guardians' now protect that provincial capital against al Qaeda fighters who previously used it as a major base of operations. The old strategy of targeted raids failed in Diyala, as in Anbar and elsewhere throughout Iraq. The new strategy of protecting the population, in combination with targeted raids, has succeeded so well that al Qaeda in Iraq now holds no major urban sanctuary.
This turnabout coincided with an increase in American forces in Iraq and a change in their mission to securing the population. Not only were more American troops moving about the country, but they were much more visible as they established positions spread out among urban populations. According to all the principles of the consensus counterterrorism strategy, the effect of this surge should have been to generate more terrorists and more terrorism. Instead, it enabled the Iraqi people to throw off the terrorists whose ideas they had already rejected, confident that they would be protected from horrible reprisals. It proved that, at least in this case, conventional forces in significant numbers conducting a traditional counterinsurgency mission were absolutely essential to defeating this cellular terrorist group.
What lessons does this example hold for future fights in the War on Terror? First, defeating al Qaeda in Iraq requires continuing an effective counterinsurgency strategy that involves American conventional forces helping Iraqi Security Forces to protect the population in conjunction with targeted strikes. Reverting to a strategy relying only on targeted raids will allow al Qaeda to re-establish itself in Iraq and begin once again to gain strength. In the longer term, we must fundamentally re-evaluate the consensus strategy for fighting the war on terror. Success against al Qaeda in Iraq obviously does not show that the solution to problems in Waziristan, Baluchistan or elsewhere lies in an American-led invasion. Each situation is unique, each al-Qaeda franchise is unique, and responses must be tailored appropriately.
But one thing is clear from the Iraqi experience. It is not enough to persuade a Muslim population to reject al Qaeda's ideology and practice. Someone must also be willing and able to protect that population against the terrorists they had been harboring, something that special forces and long-range missiles alone can't do.
Someone has WAY too much time on their hands!
Garbage-mouth has made his usual endless post, so that makes this thread an official propaganda fountain of the Bush know-nothings.
The latest 'official' statements indicate that 'partition' is the way to go, since both al-Maliki and the State Department are unhappy with it. Anything ELSE that one side likes the other discards; and here we have a solution that both sides dislike for their own selfish reasons. Bush's and Cheney's ego; and al-Maliki's grandeur in leading Iraq to no place in particular. Power is hard to give up, and partition forces all sides to yield - Bush's legacy, and al-Maliki's position as a head of a central government full of fraud and corruption, and unable to govern.
Al-Maliki is not about to surrender 'turf', and the perks that come with it - including a LOT of funding and help from the U.S. Our government, led by Blockhead Bush, is not about to admit that their policies will never work successfully. Each side is working for their OWN motives and legacy, and caught in the middle are the U.S. taxpayers and the Iraqi refugees, who ironically are impeded from seeking safety in the U.S. by current policy, even after greatly helping the U.S. forces in Iraq as translators and other functions.
Easier to pour money and lives into the current scenario, and to dump the eventual blame on the next President.
(The ego of the loony who used to call himself 'Hidden Imam' is also fragile - he just hopes that this whole mess drags on long enough that he won't still be around to criticize for supporting failure all this time. Easy to speak of success, when it's all proposed in the future, along with risk of failure. 'Not on my watch' is the policy of both this poster-creep and the Admin. who once persecuted Generals like Shinseki for daring to say that this war could cost far more, and require more troops.)
dailynews.att.net/cgi-bin/news?e=pub&dt=070930&cat=international&st=int ernationald8rvt0t80&src=ap
' ... Iraq's constitution lays down a federal system, allowing Shiites in the south, Kurds in the north and Sunnis in the center and west of the country to set up regions with considerable autonomous powers.
Nevertheless, ethnic and sectarian turmoil have snarled hopes of negotiating such measures, especially given deep divisions on sharing the country's vast oil resources. Oil reserves and existing fields would fall mainly into the hands of Kurds and Shiites if such a division were to occur. ... '
(And there we have it. The problem is the oil revenues. The Kurds have ample oil, and want nothing to do with either the Sunni or the Shia. They never considered themselves Arabs to begin with, and consider themselves superior to the Arab Sunni and Shia. Of course, the Sunni and Shia consider the Kurds to be the 'hillbillies' in the sticks. The Sunni have no oil to speak of in their provinces, but the Shia in the South are well off. Kurdistan is a fine model for what Iraq COULD become, but their success to date was insured by our 1990's efforts in giving them the space to work out their problems.)
------------------------------
www.strategypage.com/dls/articles2006/20061017232532.asp
'Why is there peace and prosperity in the north, and why doesn't anyone talk about it? Actually, the economy is booming in the Shia Arab south as well, but there is also some violence down there. But nearly all the violence you hear about in Iraq is in Sunni Arab areas of central Iraq. Meanwhile, the north is so peaceful that Western journalists, and just about anyone else, can move about freely, without fear of attack. How can this be? Well, for one thing, the Kurds have tight controls on their borders, and any Arabs entering are checked carefully. Arab Iraqis are welcome to visit, and many do, for vacations from the violence in the south. When asked, Kurds attribute their peaceful neighborhood to the fact that Kurds are not Arabs. But this is not the main reason, for the Kurds have, in the past, been as factious and violent as the Iraqi Arabs are now. But during the 1990s, when the U.S. and Britain agreed to keep Saddam's forces out of the north (to prevent another large scale massacre of Kurds), the Kurds sorted out their differences and learned the benefits of cooperation and law and order. In effect, the Kurds had a ten year head start on the rest of Iraq, in the 'how to create peace and democracy' department.'
(When you read the rantings of someone unwilling to comprehend the scope of the failure of the past years, plus their inability to grasp the outcome - bear in mind also the similar mindset of those that got us into this quagmire, and how absolutely certain Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Perle and others were of success. The above-named egomaniacs are no longer around to set policy, but the detritus resulting from their roles remains).
www.commondreams.org/views03/0313-08.htm
Published on Thursday, March 13, 2003
The High Costs of War With Iraq: The Administration Plays 'Russian Roulette' With Our Economy
by William D. Hartung
The Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times all reported recently that the Pentagon told White House budget officials and key members of Congress to expect a supplemental budget request of $60 billion to $95 billion to pay for just the first six months to a year of war with Iraq, covering both the combat phase and initial expenses for peacekeeping and occupation. The figures, which are far higher than the figure of 'less than $50 billion' that had been cited in the past by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, led to 'sticker shock' on the part of some key administration officials. The Los Angeles Times account cited budget officials concerns that 'war planners have no firm grip on the conflict's final costs,' and quoted a State Department official as saying, 'It's like watching the numbers roll higher and higher on a slot machine.'
Late last week, the Congressional Budget Office released new, higher estimates of the costs of a war with Iraq which suggested that the cost of mobilizing for the war would reach $14 billion, with actual combat costing $10 billion for the first month and $8 billion for each month thereafter.
The $60 to $95 billion estimate likely is just a down payment on the full costs of the war: it excludes the high price of recruiting allies and the costs of postwar peacekeeping, reconstruction, and humanitarian aid beyond the first six months to a year.
(Our own 13 colonies went through similar political spasms in creating our Constitution. Each of the individual colonies had their own militias, and currency, and many strongly resisted the creation of a strong central government, thereby ceding their own powers. In OUR case, there were NO RELIGIOUS FACTIONS WORKING AGAINST EACH OTHER, as in Iraq. The benefits of creating a strong central government in the U.S. included paying off war debts and creating a unified armed forces, and we had Washington to serve as our first President; a massive UNITING force at the time.
Iraq's people, on the other hand, have been divided on religious grounds for 1,400 years, and it took either British rule, or the succeeding strong central governments (including Saddam) to maintain order. Now, the power is in the hands of the sectarian and tribal militias, and al-Maliki has no way to bring the sides together for the good of a centrally-run Iraq. The driving issue are al-Maliki's clinging to power and position, and the oil revenue, as well as Bush having once again to face the fact that his strategy has been a failure for his entire Presidency. We are seeing much the same in Afghanistan, where the Taliban refuse to recognize Karzai's government, except as a puppet of an occupation).
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campaignsandelections.com/nh/releases/index.cfm?ID=4468
A few key facts about the Biden amendment:
The legislation does not tell Iraqis what to do. It speaks only to what U.S. policy should be.
Federalism is not a U.S. or foreign imposition on Iraq. Iraq's own constitution calls a 'decentralized, federal system' and sets out the powers of the regions (extensive) and those of the central government (limited). The Constitution also says that in case of conflict between regional and national law, regional law prevails.
Federalism is not partition. In fact, it's probably the only way to prevent partition or, even worse, the total fragmentation of Iraq.
Federalism will not accelerate sectarian cleansing; it's the only way to stop it. Iraqis are already voting with their feet, as yesterday's article in the New York Times demonstrates. Before the surge, Iraqis were fleeing their homes at a rate of about 40,000 month; now, it's about 100,000 a month. Unless Iraqis come to some kind of agreement on sharing power peacefully, the cleansing will continue.
'A few key facts about the Biden amendment:'
The non binding, signifies nothing, never going to happen, complete waste of time Biden amendment? Lookie! Lookie! If an amendment falls in the forest and it has no credibility or will to enforce it, does it make a sound?
OK PB, it is clear, you are just a shiite stooge. You have seen that you are not going to get the whole pie now that our armed forces have effectively co-opted a good portion of the Sunni insurgency, now you are angeling for a 3rd of the pie. Face it, Iran is going to have to warm up to getting ZERO percent of Iraq's oil wealth.
Feel the frustration PB, you idiot nobody. I love your sweet, sweet helpless rage. :-D
By ALISSA J. RUBIN
Published: October 1, 2007
BAGHDAD, Sept. 30 — The American Embassy on Sunday reiterated its support for a united Iraq as six political parties together voiced their objection to a United States Senate resolution that endorsed partitioning the country into three states. In a statement released Sunday, the embassy said: “Our goal in Iraq remains the same: a united democratic, federal Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself.
“Attempts to partition or divide Iraq by intimidation, force or other means into three separate states would produce extraordinary suffering and bloodshed.”
The statement rebuffs the nonbinding Senate measure, sponsored by Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., Democrat of Delaware, and approved last week, which calls for Iraq to be divided into federal regions controlled separately by Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites. The proposal resembles the power-sharing arrangement used to end the 1990s war in Bosnia among Muslims, Serbs and Croats.
Many Iraqi politicians have reacted angrily to the proposal, suggesting that at the very least they find it presumptuous. Opposition to it has even found currency on the street, where Iraqis have volunteered their opinion to American reporters they encountered. Said one, “So you are going to divide our country?”
At a joint news conference on Sunday, six diverse political parties that are discussing the removal of the current government objected to a divided Iraq.
“We think this would complicate the security problem and Iraq would undertake a long-term war and a civil war more than we have witnessed already,” said Basim Shareef, a member of the Fadhila Party, told reporters.
The Kurdish parties and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, led by the Shiite cleric Abdul Aziz Hakim, however, strongly support an arrangement in which much of the central government’s power is devolved to the regions. The Kurds already run a semiautonomous state in the north, and the Supreme Council hopes to see the nine majority Shiite provinces in the south band together to form a Shiite region.
www.nytimes.com/2007/10/01/world/middleeast/01iraq.html?hp
Iraq rebuffs U.S. push for power-sharing
The country's leaders are united in their opposition to a Senate-backed resolution urging sectarian-dominated regions.
By Ned Parker and and Raheem Salman, Los Angeles Times Staff Writers
10:13 AM PDT, September 30, 2007
BAGHDAD -- Iraq's divided political leadership, in a rare show of unity, skewered a non-binding U.S. Senate resolution approved in Washington last week that endorsed the decentralization of Iraq into semiautonomous regions.
The measure's advocacy of a weaker central government and strong Sunni Arab, Shiite and Kurdish regions has touched a nerve in the Iraqi political arena, stoking fears that the United States is planning to partition Iraq.
'The Congress adopted this proposal based on an incorrect reading and unrealistic estimations or the history, present and future of Iraq,' said Ezzat al Shahbander, a member of secular former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's parliament bloc.
He was reading from a statement also signed by Iraq's preeminent religious Shiite Muslim parties and the main Sunni Arab bloc.
'It represents a dangerous precedent to establishing the nature of relationship between Iraq and the USA,' the statement said, 'and shows the Congress as if it were planning for a long-term occupation by their country's troops and for their staying in Iraq.'
The nonbinding power-sharing measure was approved in Washington on Wednesday, and resentment appears to be building daily in Iraq. Approved by a 75-to-23 margin, it supports a 'federal system' that would create sectarian-dominated regions.
www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iraq1oct01,1,873000.story< br />
U.S. Embassy rips Iraq partition plan
30 September, 2007
By QASSIM ABDUL-ZAHRA, Associated Press Writer 1 minute ago
BAGHDAD - The U.S. Embassy on Sunday criticized a Senate resolution that could lead to a division of the country into sectarian or ethnic territories, agreeing with a swath of Iraqi leaders in saying the proposal 'would produce extraordinary suffering and bloodshed.'
The unusual statement from the Bush administration came just hours after representatives of Iraq‘s major political parties denounced the U.S. Senate proposal calling for a limited centralized government with the bulk of the power given to the country‘s Shiite, Sunni or Kurdish regions, saying it would seriously hamper Iraq‘s future stability.
The nonbinding Senate resolution adopted last week calls for Iraq to be divided into federal regions under control of Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis in a power-sharing agreement similar to the one that ended the 1990s war in Bosnia. Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., was a prime sponsor of the measure.
www.bloggernews.net/110579
September 28th, 2007 by Nancy Reyes
The news from the latest Democratic debate is that most of the candidates admitted that they might not immediately pull troops from Iraq.
When the left wing activists have been pressuring them to say the opposite, why would even someone like Obama who opposed the war in Iraq, hedge his bets?
The first reason is that the removal of US troops would lead to chaos. The dirty little secret is that there is a chaotic sitution in the region, and only dictatorships keep the hatreds under control. The danger is that denying democratic outlets for such ideas is like a pressure cooker: And one only has to look at the hundreds of thousands killed when the former Yugoslavia imploded into a regional civil war with ethnic hatred.
The low grade civil war in Iraq is just now getting under control. But removing the “moderate” influence of the US Troops before the Iraqi police and army can take their place is not an overnight work.
And if the positive trends in the middle East continue, any Democratic candidate who limits their choices based on old data is likely to find the world has changed and his or her position is now passe.
And those on the left who cite Viet Nam to prove such insurgencies cannot be defeated ignore that similar communist insurgencies in many other countries, from El Salvador to Malaysia to Luzon, have been defeated, and that jihadi insurgencies in Asia are not in good shape: Indonesia has recently shut down their own Al qaeda funded insurgency, with the Philippines being not far behind.
Ray Robinson is publishing a new book about the isolation, collapse and destruction of foreign Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
What is important is that he finds links between the recent German jihadi arrests and the German troops success in Afghanistan. (and two kidnappings of Germans in that country, one of whom has been rescued, as a way to remove the German troops).
What has changed in the last year however is Europe: Both France and Germany have elected more pro American leaders, despite their traditional Anti American press (which hates Bush almost as much as they hated Reagan in the 1980’s).
The dirty little secret is that a simplistic view of the war on the ideology of Islamofascism is not limited to Iraq, and that one can argue from now to doomsday about if the US should go to war, but if one is aiming to be president, one has to take into consideration all the “ifs” and decide on the least bad choice.
US toll in Iraq at low ebb as Ramadan attacks decline
15 min ago
BAGHDAD (AFP) — US military deaths in Iraq stood at a 14-month low on Sunday and Ramadan attacks were sharply down on last year, US commanders said, while announcing that at least 20 insurgents had been killed.
The military said the suspected Al-Qaeda militants were killed by US aircraft as they headed into a palm grove northwest of Baghdad on Saturday after opening fire on an air patrol with a rocket-propelled grenade and small arms.
As September drew to a close, US military losses for the month stood at the lowest monthly figure since July last year, according to an AFP tally based on Pentagon figures.
The figure marks the fourth consecutive drop in the monthly death toll following a high in May.
US commanders said this was largely thanks to the 'surge' strategy which saw an extra 28,500 US personnel deployed from mid-February, mainly in Baghdad and the neighbouring province of Anbar to the west.
'The trend is certainly in the right direction,' US military spokesman Rear Admiral Mark Fox told a press conference in Baghdad.
'The surge unquestionably is what has been the catalyst that has created the opportunity to have more forces operating in more places at the same time and to deny Al-Qaeda and the extremists safe haven and to take away sanctuaries.'
The commander on the ground in Al-Anbar province, the big success story as far as the military is concerned thanks to an anti-Al-Qaeda partnership with Sunni sheikhs, said things were even better in his zone during Ramadan.
Brigadier General Mark Gurganus reported a 38 percent drop in incidents across Iraq during the first fortnight of Ramadan compared to the same period last year.
In Anbar, there had been roughly 90 incidents during each of the first two weeks of the Muslim holy month this year compared to 415 during one week alone in 2006.
He cautioned that Al-Qaeda would try to work its way back into the population centres in the province and spoke of his fear they might try another high-profile killing there as they did earlier in the month.
Sunni sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Reesha, who had forged a powerful coalition of more than 40 Anbar tribes against Al-Qaeda, was killed by a roadside bomb on the first day of Ramadan, September 13.
'One of the things that always concerns me is their constant desire to pull off the one spectacular attack,' said General Gurganus in the joint press conference with Fox.
According to Fox, meanwhile, the military has seized sophisticated Iranian-made surface-to-air missiles that were being used by insurgents in the war-torn country.
Several Misagh-1s have been found in different locations, he said, but stopped short of saying the use of the weapons represented an escalation of Iranian activity in Iraq.
'We've said that we've found these things, we've seen them employed. That's significant in its own right,' Fox told reporters.
The remarks came amid heightened tension between Tehran and Washington after US forces detained Iranian national Mahmudi Farhadi in northern Iraq last week, prompting Iran to close its border with the Kurdish autonomous region.
US commanders accuse Farhadi, detained 10 days ago in the northern province of Sulaimaniyah, of being one of the kingpins in bomb smuggling operations.
The surge is finally having some local effect, and the Sunnis are motivated to drive out al Qaeda. They were motivated BEFORE the surge ever happened. The vast majority of the insurgents are Sunni, in the first place, and we've armed them and funded them, which is making the Shia unhappy. There's no assurance that the now-armed Sunni won't just end up battling the Shia majority.
After the surge (whenever that is), the Iraqi forces will have to handle it themselves, and they're not nearly as well equipped as U.S. forces. We have a giant band-aid on the problem, which won't hold once pressure is released. More like a tourniquet.
The Iraqi constitution allows for Federalism, in some degree - it's implicit. The U.S. has both a strong Federal government, and plenty of states-rights advocates looking to return powers to the States. What we DON'T have is the religious factionalism.
As this next article notes, the Kurds are in favor of separation. The problem is the Sunni, who lack oil revenue. There's also a massive resentment in Iraq about the U.S.' setting policy, as well as the graft and corruption in Baghdad that's making some wealthy. Saddam did the same thing with Oil for Food. This Iraqi government is rotten to the core, particularly at the Ministerial level. Also inept, as the wasted reconstruction funds have revealed.
www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSKAR758381
BAGHDAD, Oct 1 (Reuters) - Angry Iraqis have denounced a U.S. Senate vote for the creation of federal regions in Iraq as a plot to divide their country, but the outrage puzzles some who say federalism is already enshrined in their constitution.
Last week's non-binding Senate resolution, calling for a federal government and creation of federal regions, provoked storms of protest from politicians including Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who said it would be a disaster for Iraq. Only Iraq's Kurds, who already enjoy autonomy in the north of the country, openly welcomed it.
Some officials and politicians said the anger in Baghdad was more a reaction to perceived outside interference in Iraqi affairs than to the contents of the non-binding resolution.
Opponents of federalism were also using the Senate vote to portray the concept as a foreign agenda, they said. 'Some people who do not believe in federalism and want a central system benefited from this by campaigning against it and made it look as if it's a campaign to divide Iraq,' a Shi'ite politician who declined to speak publicly said.
Give the link and a few paragraphs, and stop cluttering up the joint.
I realize that anything resembling 'good news' gives you an orgasm, by try to keep that part to yourself.
The Iraqi constitution allows for Federalism to a large degree, and the complaints are coming for a number of reasons.
a). Those holding power in Iraq enjoy the perks, and the graft and corruption making many wealthy in the ministries. No one wants to give up power.
b). Bush cannot handle anything other than his current plan - the Admin. has a lot invested in this fiasco, and having a working solution come from Congress is the last thing they want.
c). The Iraqis are fed up with U.S. policy, and for those who are opposed to federalism in the first place, this becomes a good excuse to complain about American interference.
Aside from al Qaeda, which is not welcome in either Sunni or Shia territory:
The Shia have taken over major once-Sunni portions of Baghdad, and in those areas, Shia militia are in charge. That of course reduces Sunni/Shia violence. The U.S. forces have constructed blast walls all over the remaining Sunni area creating enclaves difficult to penetrate. That keeps out both al Qaeda and the Shia from those places, and at the same time hems in the Sunni, who no longer are free to move about as they once did. It's more difficult to attack the Sunni for that reason.
www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-realworld16sep16,0,1815812 .story?coll=la-home-world
'As U.S. Army Gen. David H. Petraeus and President Bush laud the success of the Baghdad security plan and hail the start of a return to normality, the Iraqi capital is awash with at least 171,000 displaced people, including Abu Ali. Many Sunnis and Shiites have retreated to virtually segregated districts sealed off by blast walls and razor wire to protect themselves from their rival religious sect. Even U.S. commanders in Iraq acknowledge that there is no easy way to repair the damage of the country's civil war, no easy way to return people to their old lives. They say that whatever comes next in Baghdad will be a break from the past.'
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Since U.S. troops have fewer incidents to deal with, and the Sunni and U.S. forces combined have put pressure on al Qaeda, and there are fewer crowds than there once were in Sunni areas, the death toll per incident drops. Our better-armored vehicles are arriving, which drops the death toll of U.S. troops per incident.
None of this resolves the essential problem of insuring ongoing safety for Iraq post-surge - that's a political problem that remains unsolved. Even Syria pointed that out at the U.N., as it's a financial hardship on them to host the exiled Iraqis.
uk.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUK119126393845._CH_.24202007100 1
DAMASCUS, Oct 1 (Reuters) - Syria reimposed rules barring entry to Iraqi refugees on Monday, the United Nations refugee agency said. 'The borders are once again closed (to refugees),' said a spokeswoman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 'The UNHCR will urge Syria to grant humanitarian visas.'
Jordan, the other main escape route for Iraqi refugees, imposed visas a few years ago but Syria had granted Iraqis a three-month permit to stay at the border.
Last month Damascus introduced tougher regulations, citing pressure on its infrastructure and public services, but lifted them a few days later as a temporary gesture for the start of the fasting month of Ramadan. Under the new scheme, only Iraqi merchants, businessmen and university professors with visas obtained from Syrian embassies may enter Syria.
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